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This paper studies short sellers’ trading strategies and their eﬀects on the
ﬁnancial market by examining their accusations of fraud against Chinese
reverse merger ﬁrms (CRMs) in the US. We ﬁnd that short sellers rely on ﬁrms’
fundamental information, especially relative ﬁnancial indicators, to locate
their “prey.” Speciﬁcally, they compare a target ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial indicators
(e.g., growth and receivables) with both the industry average and the ﬁrm’s his-
tory. We ﬁnd no evidence that short sellers accuse CRMs simply because of
their reverse merger label. Additionally, we test the accuracy of short sellers’
accusations in the long run and ﬁnd that accused ﬁrms are more likely to delist
and less likely to recover from price plunges. Our results also indicate that
CRMs’ high exposure to short sellers’ accusations stem from adverse selection
problems: ﬁrms with high litigation risk are more likely to choose reverse
mergers to access the US capital market. Overall, our results support the view
that short sellers are sophisticated investors and shed some light on their deci-
sion processes.
 2015 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The eﬀect that short sellers have on the ﬁnancial market is a topic of great debate. On the one hand, advo-
cates argue that short sellers are informed investors who are able to identify overpriced stocks and business(J. Ye).
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Lamont and Stein, 2004). On the other hand, dissenters argue that short sellers use abusive trading strategies,
dampen investor conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial market and decrease market liquidity (Cox, 2008). In this debate,
although many papers have suggested that short-sellers are “smart guys” who can unearth overpriced
companies and contribute to the eﬃciency of the stock market, their strategies for locating overvalued ﬁrms
and their decision processes are still unknown.
We disentangle this debate by analyzing short sellers’ motivations for accusing many US Chinese reverse
merger ﬁrms (CRMs) of ﬁnancial fraud. Between 2010 and 2011, short sellers accused 62 CRMs of fraud,
leading to an almost 50% reduction in the CRMs’ equity value. Short sellers clearly acted as crucial “fraud
detectors” in the process, because most of these scandals started with short sellers’ reports that questioned
the credibility of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial reports. However, the real motivation behind short sellers’ accusations
against CRMs remains unknown. How do short sellers locate their prey? Do they base their accusations on
information analytics or guilt by association? What kind of information do they use in their decision
processes? This paper ﬁlls this gap in the literature.
We ﬁnd no evidence that short sellers accuse CRMs simply because of their association with other
ill-reputed CRMs (referred to as guilt by association). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that short sellers pay attention
to unusually high growth in proﬁtability and accounts receivables. In particular, they identify targets by
comparing ﬁnancial indicators with the industry average or with ﬁrms’ histories. Firms with poor internal con-
trol, a small proportion of outside directors, a low level of managerial shareholdings and low-quality audit
reports are more likely to be targets of short sellers. We further check the long-term performance of accused
ﬁrms to test the accuracy of short sellers’ accusations. Accused ﬁrms are more likely to delist from exchanges
and less likely to recover from price plunges following short-sellers’ accusations. Our results also suggest that
CRMs’ high exposure to short sellers’ accusations stems from adverse selection problems: ﬁrms with high lit-
igation risk are more likely to choose reverse mergers to access the US capital market.
Two competing hypotheses attempt to explain the strategies behind short sellers’ fraud accusations. The
information analytics hypothesis regards short sellers’ research reports as reliable outputs produced by careful
analysis. Therefore, their intensive attacks against CRMs are well-founded: ﬁrms targeted by short sellers are
indeed inferior to their counterparts in terms of information disclosure. Many papers provide corroborating
evidence of the informativeness of short sellers’ actions. They argue that short sellers are able to identify stock
overpricing and ﬁrm misconduct (e.g., Jones and Lamont, 2002; Christophe et al., 2004, 2009; Diether et al.,
2009; Karpoﬀ and Lou, 2010). At the same time, many argue that it is not necessarily true that short sellers are
betting against information. Short sellers could take advantage of investors’ negative perception of the CRM
society and indiscriminately accuse any member of the society of “guilt by association.” As an example,
Dennis E. Nixon, the Chairman of Bancshares, claimed that his bank was attacked by short sellers who viewed
it as guilty because of its association with banks in crisis and their troubles. Moreover, former SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox (2008) noted that even “far-better” ﬁnancial companies, such as JPMorgan Chase, could be
vulnerable to guilt by association. We refer to this view as the “guilt by association hypothesis.”
To empirically test the two hypotheses, we collect data on all US-listed Chinese ﬁrms, including IPO ﬁrms
(CIPO) and CRMs, and short sellers’ reports accusing Chinese ﬁrms of fraud. We test the two hypotheses in
two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, we directly test whether a CRM is more likely to be attacked by short sellers after
controlling for other factors and study the information they use in their decision process. In the second phase, we
examine the post-accusation performance of accused ﬁrms to further test the validity of short sellers’ accusations.
In the ﬁrst phase, we use a dummy variable indicating the identity (CRM or CIPO) of a Chinese ﬁrm and
conventional factors that are known to aﬀect the occurrence of ﬁrm misconduct to explain a ﬁrm’s probability
of being accused. Because the factors aﬀecting the probability of ﬁnancial misstatement may also decide a
ﬁrm’s choice between reverse merger and IPO in the ﬁrst place, we use two-stage IV approaches and propen-
sity score matching to mitigate the endogeneity problem. We ﬁnd no evidence that short sellers are more likely
to accuse CRMs, after controlling for other factors. We document that short sellers target ﬁrms that have
abnormally high growth in proﬁtability and a higher proportion of accounts receivables relative to the indus-
try average or ﬁrms’ histories. Short sellers also pay attention to ﬁrms with weak fundamentals. These results
indicate that CRMs’ high exposure to short sellers’ accusations stems from ﬁrms’ adverse selection at the
initial stage.
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we show that accused ﬁrms are generally more likely to delist than other ﬁrms. To ensure that the delisting is not
simply caused by the feedback eﬀects of short sellers’ accusations, we then conduct a longitudinal data analysis.
Goldstein and Guembel (2008) argue that short selling may cause a price decline even when short sellers are not
informed at all. A short seller can establish a short position on the stock and the selling pressure will drive the
price down. The price decline will subsequently lead to cancelation of real investment projects and a reduction
in the real value of the ﬁrm. If feedback eﬀects were indeed at work, ﬁrms’ survival times would be uncorrelated
with short sellers’ accusations. However, we ﬁnd that non-accused ﬁrms generally stay in the market for longer
than accused ﬁrms. This result suggests that such delisting is caused by ex-ante deterioration in ﬁrm fundamen-
tals. Next, we examine the price performance of accused ﬁrms (both delisted ﬁrms and active ﬁrms) after the
release of short sellers’ research reports. If short sellers’ accusations are groundless andmisleading, investors will
eventually realize this and the stock prices of implicated ﬁrms should rebound to their fair values. In contrast, if
the price drops are caused by accusations that are informative about the poor quality of the ﬁrms, their stock
prices are unlikely to recover. The summary statistics show that Chinese ﬁrms subsequently exhibit poor price
performance and none of them are able to recover their stock prices to the pre-accusation level. Speciﬁcally,
63.7% of ﬁrms experienced a further price drop and only four ﬁrms recovered to more than 70% of their pre-
accusation price. The results indicate that accused Chinese ﬁrms were generally overvalued before accusations
and support the view that short sellers’ are informed investors who are able to identify “bad apples.”
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the literature on short
sellers’ decision processes. Although many papers have suggested that short sellers are “smart guys” who can
unearth overvalued companies and contribute to eﬃcient stock prices, only a handful of papers have examined
their decision processes. Dechow et al. (2001), for example, show that short sellers particularly target ﬁrms
that have a low fundamental (book value, earnings and cash ﬂow) to price ratio. Desai et al. (2002) suggest
that short selling is related to suspect ﬁnancial reporting. However, no previous study, to the best of our
knowledge, has examined the possibility that short sellers may also be taking advantage of the guilt by associa-
tion fallacy. Indeed, industry has made a strong argument that short sellers sometimes simply indiscriminately
attack ﬁrms associated with an ill-fated label, such as “banks” during the ﬁnancial crisis period or CRMs at
times when many such ﬁrms were exposed as fraudulent. This paper ﬁlls this gap. We ﬁnd no evidence that
short sellers are making use of the guilt by association fallacy. Second, we further analyze the information
set short sellers use. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial information and corporate governance are important considera-
tions, especially relative ﬁnancial indicators. Thus, our paper also contributes to the literature on ﬁrm fraud.
Third, our paper also contributes to the literature debating the adverse selection and credibility of CRMs. We
provide evidence that corroborates the ﬁndings of several working papers that have recently studied this issue
by conducting fundamental analysis of CRMs (Lee et al., 2013). Finally, we contribute to the debate over the
eﬀects that short sellers have on the ﬁnancial market.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and hypothesis
development; Section 3 describes the data and sample selection; Section 4 discusses the research design and
empirical results; Section 5 reports the robustness checks; and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Short sellers’ strategies
2.1.1. “Information analytics” hypothesis
Studies that examine the association between short selling and stock overpricing provide corroborating evi-
dence about short sellers’ information analytics. A large body of the literature ﬁnds that short sale activities
preceding either unfavorable news or analyst downgrades are signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the
extent of subsequent stock price declines (e.g., Christophe et al., 2004, 2009; Liu et al., 2008; Diether et al.,
2009). For example, Christophe et al. (2009) ﬁnd abnormal short-selling activity before analyst downgrades.
Diether et al. (2009) ﬁnd that short sellers increase their trading following positive returns and correctly
predict future negative abnormal returns. Those results are consistent with the view that short sellers trade
on the short-term overreaction of stock prices.
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stocks and business misconduct. Miller (1977) was the ﬁrst to point out that the constraint on short selling
leads to stock over-pricing. Subsequent studies support this prediction. Lamont and Stein (2004) and Jones
and Lamont (2002) ﬁnd that stocks that are costly to short have very low abnormal returns in the subsequent
year. Karpoﬀ and Lou (2010) study the short interest in stocks that are proven ex-post to be overvalued. They
ﬁnd that abnormal short interest increases steadily in the 19 months before the negative information is
publicly revealed, particularly when the misconduct is severe. These results indicate that short sellers are
proﬁcient at analyzing information and are able to uncover ﬁnancial misconduct. Relevant studies that
directly examine the accounting quality of CRMs also provide evidence of short sellers’ sophistication.
Chen et al. (2012) argue that CRMs exhibit lower ﬁnancial reporting quality than US RM ﬁrms.
Based on the reasoning above, we develop the information analytics hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. All else being equal, CRMs are no more likely to be accused by short sellers than their CIPO
counterparties.2.1.2. Guilt by association hypothesis
A contradictory view suggests that short sellers do not always bet against information. Rather, short sellers
may simply be motivated by investors’ negative perception of the CRM society and indiscriminately accuse its
members of guilt by association. We refer to this view as the “guilt by association hypothesis.”
The guilt by association fallacy is widely documented in the psychological literature. It refers to the
unpleasant and often emotional assumption that an individual will have committed a crime if other individuals
with the same social label have committed that crime. A typical example of such a fallacy is that “Simon, Karl,
Jared and Brett are all petty criminals, and they are all friends of Josh. Therefore, Josh is a petty criminal.”
The stock market is conducive to such misperceptions because investors often value stocks based on the per-
formance of the industry, region or any other peer group to which the ﬁrm belongs. Darrough et al. (2012) ﬁnd
that the high exposure of Chinese ﬁrms to fraud accusations aﬀects not only the stock prices of accused ﬁrms,
but also those of seemingly quite legitimate Chinese ﬁrms. Lee et al. (2013) examine the initial ﬁnancial health
and subsequent performance of reverse mergers and ﬁnd that Chinese RMs are generally healthier and fare
better than both their US RM counterparts and a group of industry-, size- and date-matched publicly traded
ﬁrms from the same exchange. An implication is that given the huge negative perception about “made in
China” and the prevalence of the guilt by association fallacy, it is possible that many accused Chinese ﬁrms
are merely victims of their association with truly fraudulent ﬁrms.
Several studies have examined the strategies that inﬂuential players use to spread rumors to make a proﬁt.
The basic idea is that informed traders sometimes send false signals to their followers, then if the followers act
on the false signal and move the price in the wrong direction, the informed trader can make a proﬁt. Bommel
(2003), for example, models that an informed investor with limited capital can spread imprecise rumors to
followers, convince them to trade excessively and then make a proﬁt from the subsequent price overshoots:
she ﬁrst trades when she receives private information and then when she knows the price to be overshooting.
Fishman and Hagerty (1992) argue that corporate insiders who are required to disclose their trades can proﬁt
by signaling to their followers that they are trading on information, when in fact they are not. Of course, inves-
tors only believe in the rumors that they ﬁnd plausible. The claim that a particular CRM ﬁrm is fraudulent is
certainly a potentially plausible rumor because many other CRMs are fraudulent and investors are subject to
the behavioral bias of committing the guilt by association fallacy. Aware of this phenomenon, short sellers can
accuse CRMs and beneﬁt from the resulting stock price drop and ruined reputation of the accused ﬁrm.
The guilt by association fallacy has been witnessed many times in the real world. The dot-com bubble is
obviously a good illustration of such a fallacy, in a positive way. Another example is the International
Bancshares Corporation. Dennis E. Nixon, the Chairman of Bancshares, claimed that his bank was attacked
by short sellers who viewed it as guilty simply because of its association with the major banks and their troubles.
Based on the reasoning above, we develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b. Short sellers’ reports are based on the guilt by association fallacy. All else being equal, CRMs
are more likely to be accused by short sellers than their non-CRM counterparts.
Table 1
Summary of factors inﬂuencing fraud-related litigation documented in prior studies.
Fraud against shareholders (ﬁrms’ characteristics) Fraud against auditors (auditors’ characteristics)
Authors (Year) Cadmus
and Child
(1953)
Beasley
(1996)
Haslem
(2005)
Persons
(2005)
Efendi
et al.
(2007)
Stice
(1991)
Carcello and
Palmrose
(1994)
Lys and
Watts
(1994)
Krishnan and
Krishnan
(1997)
Farber
(2005)
Governance factors
Internal control *
Board eﬃciency *
Board independence * * * *
Managerial ownership *
CEO power * * * * *
Financial factors *
Account receivables * *
Inventory * *
Growth * * *
Proﬁtability * * *
Size * * * * * * *
Financial distress * * * * *
Potential accruals-based Errors * * *
Auditor factors
Auditor rank *
Auditor independence * *
Industry factors * *
Year factors * *
This table summarizes the factors found to aﬀect the probability of fraud in prior studies. The extant literature on ﬁnancial misstatement
generally falls into two categories. The ﬁrst focuses on fraud litigation against shareholders and establishes a link between the likelihood of
ﬁnancial misstatement and ﬁrms’ characteristics before the revealing of misstatements (Cadmus and Child, 1953; Beasley, 1996; Haslem,
2005; Persons, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007). The second stream focuses on auditors’ risk management and analyzes the fraud litigation risk
factors of both ﬁrms and auditors (Stice, 1991; Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Lys and Watts, 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Farber,
2005).
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Karpoﬀ and Lou (2010) suggest that short sellers are good at identifying fraudulent ﬁrms. If short sellers
are indeed sophisticated investors, what kind of information do they rely on? A number of studies on fraud
ﬁrms have shed light on this question (e.g., Cadmus and Child, 1953; Beasley, 1996; Haslem, 2005; Persons,
2005; Dechow et al., 2001) by identifying the factors that aﬀect the probability of fraud. We summarize these
factors in Table 1. Beasley (1996) argues that having a larger proportion of outside members on the board of
directors signiﬁcantly reduces the likelihood of ﬁnancial statement fraud. Efendi et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
misstatements are more likely to occur in ﬁrms in which the CEO has sizable holdings of in-the-money stock
options. Overall, these papers suggest that solid ﬁnancial status and good corporate governance can eﬃciently
reduce the occurrence of misconduct. More direct evidence, such as that provided by Dechow et al. (2001),
shows that short sellers use ﬁnancial information, such as the fundamental to valuation ratio, to assess
whether a stock is overpriced.
We read the short sellers’ reports and summarize the disclosed reasons for their accusations against CRMs.
These statistics are reported in Table 2.1 Of the 37 accusations, overstatement of proﬁtability (operating rev-
enue, net income and gross proﬁt margin) and misleading operating information (forged contracts, false cli-
ents, false branches or false technologies) are the two leading reasons for accusations. More importantly, the
reports indicate that short sellers value relative ﬁnancial information. In the last two columns, we highlight the
indicators that are usually compared with the industry average and ﬁrm history. For example, Muddy Water’s1 The total number of ﬁrms under all categories exceeds the number of ﬁrms that were sued because ﬁrms were usually sued for multiple
reasons.
Table 2
Reasons for accusations by short sellers.
Detailed reasons for accusations
provided by short sellers
Total CIPOs CRMs Compared
with industry
Compared
with past
Insuﬃcient disclosure
Hiding debt 2 0 2
Hiding related transactions 10 0 10
Hiding bad operating news 11 5 6
Misleading disclosure
Misstatement of ﬁnancial information
Revenues, net income, or gross proﬁt 30 3 27
p p
Asset/accounts receivable 2 0 2
p p
Cash ﬂow 6 0 6
Turnover 1 0 1
p p
Misstatement of operating information
Contracts 3 1 2
Future development 3 1 2
Clients 5 0 5
p
Productivity 4 0 4
Retailer, sub ﬁrms 4 0 4
p
Technology 4 0 4
Others
Resignation of independent auditors and directors 7 0 7
Auditor change 8 0 8
Poor staﬀ management 2 1 1
Management fraud 6 1 5
Weak internal control 3 0 3
This table summarizes the reasons for the accusations of ﬁnancial fraud made against Chinese ﬁrms. We extract and classify all of the
reasons for each accusation disclosed in short sellers’ research and report the frequency of accusations in each category. We highlight the
indicators that are usually compared with the industry average and ﬁrm history.
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income and that of its peers: “We note that FMCN had a 2009 net income margin of 9%. AMCN and
VISN both lost money that year.”
Based on the above reasoning, we develop the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. If the information analytics hypothesis is correct, ﬁnancial information, especially relative
ﬁnancial indicators, plays a crucial role in short sellers’ decisions.2.3. Accuracy of short sellers’ accusations
Revealing the strategies or information sources that short sellers use does not necessarily speak to the valid-
ity of their accusations against CRMs. Whether short sellers’ accusations are accurate requires further
investigation.
Firms’ survival status provides a means to examine whether short sellers’ accusations are accurate. The
dynamics of the stock market (i.e., ﬁrms entering and exiting) lead to the eﬃcient reallocation of productive
resources from non-surviving to surviving ﬁrms (Baker and Kennedy, 2002). Consequently, a good ﬁrm
attracts resource inﬂows and manages to stay in the market. In contrast, the market reveals the intrinsic value
of bad ﬁrms and expels them. Therefore, we conjuncture that if short sellers can uncover the quality of ﬁrms,
then the performance of these target ﬁrms will be weaker, indicated either by their subsequent delisting or
price recovery.2 This report was published on February 3, 2011, on Muddy Water’s website: http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/research/ccme/
initiating-coverage-ccme/.
H. Liu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 111–131 117Based on this reasoning, we develop the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Firms that are targeted by short sellers are more likely to be delisted from the capital market or
are unlikely to recover from the price drop caused by the accusation.3. Data
3.1. Data source and sample construction
Our sample consists of 253 Chinese ﬁrms that went public on the US stock market between 2000 and 2011.
We ﬁrst extract company names from the CSMAR database and tickers from the Bloomberg website, then use
information from the mass media in China and the COMPUSTAT database to supplement the sample and
verify the data integrity.3 We further require ﬁrms to have non-missing ﬁnancial and proxy statements.
Annual accounting and auditor data are from the COMPUSTAT database and the AUDIT ANALYTICS
database. Annual corporate governance information is from ﬁnancial statements (10-K or 20-F) in the
SEC’s EDGAR database. Finally, we reﬁne our sample to 253 Chinese ﬁrms (1038 ﬁrm-year observations),
with 108 CRMs and 145 CIPOs.
We apply the following procedure to identify the Chinese ﬁrms that were accused of fraud by short sellers.
First, we identify Chinese ﬁrms that were once suspected of “fraud” if (1) they were sued by law ﬁrms4 or (2)
their ﬁnancial reports were questioned in news reports in the major ﬁnancial press. This procedure identiﬁes 78
ﬁrms. Second, we trace these suspected ﬁrms to decide whether short sellers initiated those suspicions. A fraud
is considered to have been “uncovered” by short sellers if (1) research reports are available on the websites of
major short sellers or (2) a short seller’s name is identiﬁed in investment reports on the websites of major
American stock market analysts.5 The sample selection procedure is summarized in Panel A of Table 3.
Panel B of Table 3 presents a breakdown of the types of short sellers behind the accusations: 10 ﬁrms were
accused by investment institutions, 35 by research groups and the remaining 10 by individual short sellers.
3.2. Status quo of lawsuits against Chinese ﬁrms
We summarize the status quo of lawsuits against Chinese ﬁrms as of December 30, 2011, in Table 4. As
many as 26 accused ﬁrms had not obtained ﬁnal verdicts by that date and only 8 had obtained ﬁnal verdicts
and closed their cases. Relying on settlement data may therefore not be a feasible method of evaluating the
credibility of short sellers’ accusations. Twenty of the 26 unsettled cases were against CRMs.
4. Empirical analysis
We present our empirical analysis in two subsections. In Section 4.1, we analyze short sellers’ strategies and
focus on the information they use in their decision-making process. In Section 4.2, we analyze the ﬁrms’ post-
accusation performance.
4.1. Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2
4.1.1. Model speciﬁcation and control variables
Previous studies have evaluated short sellers’ role by focusing on their trading patterns rather than directly
testing their strategies, largely because the latter is diﬃcult to achieve in the absence of their private3 We check our list with Chinese-localized media such as ﬁnance.sina.com and imeigu.com to make sure all US listed Chinese ﬁrms are
included.
4 We also document these law ﬁrms’ leading cases against Chinese ﬁrms: Neda Zaman Law Oﬃce, Milberg LLP, Rosen Law Firm,
Shuman Law Oﬃce, Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, Glancy Binkow & Goldberg LLP, Izard Nobel LLP, Pomerantz Law, CMS, PLLC,
Lieﬀ Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Federman & Sherwood, Law Oﬃces of Howard G. Smith, and Bronstein, Gewirtz & Grossman
LLC.
5 For example, the website “Seeking Alpha” provides sophisticated individual short sellers such as Ian Bezek, Alfred and Little Axler
and research groups such as Glaucus Research Group with a platform for publishing their investment research reports.
Table 3
Sample selection: US listed Chinese ﬁrms targeted by short sellers.
Panel A: Sample selection
Procedures Number of ﬁrms
+Chinese ﬁrms suspected as fraudulent 78
Fraud scandals revealed in investigations carried out by law ﬁrms or the SEC 16
Fraud scandals not covered in short sellers’ reports 7
=Total number of US listed Chinese ﬁnancial ﬁrms targeted by short sellers 55
Panel B: Breakdown of types of short sellers
Type of short seller Number of times acting as accuser
Investment Institutions 10
Absaroka investment institution 1
GeoInvesting 8
Kerrisdale capital 1
Research Group 35
Glaucus research group 5
International ﬁnancial research & association 1
Muddy waters research 8
Variant view research 2
Citron research 18
Lucas McGee research 1
Individuals 10
Famous analysts 8
Anonymous analysts 2
Total 55
Panel A reports the procedure for identifying Chinese ﬁrms that were accused of fraud by short sellers. Panel B presents the breakdown of
the types of short sellers.
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test their strategies.
We use both probit regression and instrument variable regression (two-stage bootstrap and Wooldridge
two-stage) to analyze short sellers’ strategies. In the probit regression, we regress the accusation indicator
dummy on the CRM indicator dummy and conventional factors that are documented to aﬀect the occurrence
of ﬁrm misconduct. For the two-stage bootstrap regression, we ﬁrst predict the ﬁtted values of the CRM indi-
cator dummy. We then use the predicted value in the second stage regression and bootstrap the system 100
times to obtain a robust estimation. The Wooldridge two-stage approach ﬁrst follows the same procedure
as the two-stage bootstrap, then we use the predicted value as the instrument to conduct the standard two-
stage least squares procedure. The models are as follows:
Model 1 (probit approach):Targeti;t ¼ b0 þ b1RMi þ cGovfactorsi;t1 þ nFinafactorsi;t1 þ /Auditfactorsi;t1 þ kIndustryi;t1
þ hYeari;t1 þ xi;t ð1ÞModel 2 (two-stage bootstrap and two-stage Wooldridge approach):RMi;t ¼ d0 þ d1ROEi;t1 þ d2LEVERAGEi;t1 þ d3CEOCHi;t1 þ d4INSTHDi;t1 þ d5LODUEi;t1
þ d6HIGHTECi;t1 þ d7CEOHDi;t1 þ d8HOTMKTi;t1 þ mi;t; ð2ÞTargeti;t ¼ b0 þ b1RMfiti þ c0Govfactorsi;t1 þ n0Finafactorsi;t1 þ /0Auditfactorsi;t1
þ k0Industryi;t1 þ h0Yeari;t1 þ xi;t: ð3Þ
Table 4
Status quo of lawsuits against accused Chinese ﬁrms.
Case classiﬁcation Total CIPOs CRMs
Total cases 55 18 37
Settled cases (with ﬁnal verdicts) 8 1 7
Unsettled cases or cases settled out of court (without ﬁnal verdicts) 26 6 20
This table summarizes the status quo of lawsuits against Chinese ﬁrms as of December 30, 2011.
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wise. The RM (reverse merger) dummy equals 1 if a ﬁrm is a CRM and 0 otherwise. If the guilt by association
hypothesis holds, we expect a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the CRM dummy and a ﬁrm’s proba-
bility of being accused. Otherwise, if the ﬁnancial information analytics hypothesis holds, we expect an
insigniﬁcant relationship.
Govfactorsi,t1 is a set of governance factors in year t1, comprising material weakness of internal control
(INTCONTRLt1), proportion of outside directors (OUTSIDE%t1), CEO duality (CEOCHt1), proportion
of CEO holdings (CEOHDt1), managerial ownership (MNGHDt1) and number of directors (BDSIZEt1).
Finafactorsi,t1 is a set of ﬁnancial factors in year t1 including ﬁrm size (SIZEt1), Zscore (ZSCt1), which
measures ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial distress following Zmijewski (1984), sales growth (GROWTHt1), return on equity
(ROEt1), accounts receivable (ARt1), leverage ratio (LEVERAGEt1) and the diﬀerence between the
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial characteristics (sales growth, ROE, inventory and accounts receivable) and the industry
average or its own past average (DIFFGR_INDt1, DIFFROE_INDt1, DIFFINV_INDt1,
DIFFAR_INDt1, DIFFGR_SELFt1, DIFFROE_SELFt1, DIFFINV_SELFt1, DIFFAR_SELFt1).
Auditfactorsi,t1 is a set of audit factors in year t1, comprising an indicator variable of whether the audi-
tor is a member of the Big 4 (ADTRANKt1), the natural logarithm of audit fee (AUDTFEEt1) and the ratio
of discretionary accruals to total assets (DAt1).
We choose the control variables that inﬂuence the likelihood of ﬁnancial misstatement, as documented in
the literature, and list them in Table 1. Weak corporate governance is believed to oﬀer a powerful explanation
for ﬁrms’ misleading reports. Material weakness of internal control is expected to increase the likelihood of
ﬁnancial misstatement because the lack of an oversight mechanism may aggravate the agency problem
(Cadmus and Child, 1953). Following Doyle et al. (2007), we use a dummy variable (INTCONTRLt1) that
speciﬁes whether a ﬁrm has material weakness of internal control to proxy for the quality of internal control
systems. We also include board size and board independence. Studies show that including more outside direc-
tors on the board reduces ﬁnancial misstatement because outsiders are more likely to question and challenge
management’s proposals (Beasley, 1996; Haslem, 20056; Efendi et al., 2007; Farber, 2005). In addition,
Haslem (2005) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with higher managerial options are more likely to settle their litigations, sug-
gesting that a high level of managerial holdings decreases the misalignment between shareholders and man-
agers’ incentives, and thus reduces the incidence of misleading ﬁnancial reports. We measure managerial
ownership as the proportion of managerial shareholdings (MNGHDt1). Because manipulations are expected
to be more likely when CEOs are able to dominate the board, we also include CEO duality (CEOCHt1) and
the proportion of CEO holdings (CEOHDt1) as proxies for CEO power.
Several factors are included to capture ﬁrm ﬁnancial characteristics, including sales growth, proﬁtability,
size, ﬁnancial distress, potential accruals-based errors, accounts receivables and inventory. Stice (1991), Lys
and Watts (1994), and Beasley (1996) ﬁnd that ﬁrm growth is positively associated with litigation, which
may be because fast-growing ﬁrms have a high turnover of inventory or receivables, and thus have a high risk
of audit detection. We measure growth by the percentage change in sales between the current and previous
year (GROWTHt1). Additionally, ﬁnancial statements are more likely to be over-reported in ﬁrms with
low proﬁtability and a strong incentive to window dress. Similarly, four studies show that ﬁnancial distress
is signiﬁcantly correlated with misstatement, but with mixed conclusions. Stice (1991) and Krishnan and
Krishnan (1997) ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁnancial distress and misstatement, whereas Carcello6 Instead of the proportion of outsiders on a board, Haslem (2005) use an opposite proxy: the percentage of inside directors on the
board.
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sured by Zscore and leverage. We include ﬁrm size (logarithm of total assets) to address the size eﬀect, according
to the literature (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Lys and Watts, 1994; Beasley, 1996; Krishnan and Krishnan,
1997; Haslem, 2005; Efendi et al., 2007). Moreover, according to Hypothesis 2, we include the diﬀerence between
a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial characteristics and the industry average level or the ﬁrm’ own historical average to capture
abnormal reported growth in ﬁnancial characteristics (e.g., sales growth, ROE and inventory).
The eﬀect of the auditor is controlled by two factors: auditor independence and auditor rank. Farber (2005)
ﬁnd that ﬁnancial fraud is less likely in ﬁrms audited by Big 4 auditors. Auditors’ proclivity to disclose dis-
covered errors is also closely related to the incidence of misstatement: the more independent the auditor,
the less likely they are to collude with their clients (Stice, 1991; Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997; Farber,
2005). We include the dummy (ADTRANKt1) to indicate whether the auditor is a member of the Big 4
and the logarithm of audit fees (AUDTFEEt1) as proxies for auditor independence. The potential
accruals-based error, proxied by the ratio of discretionary accruals to total assets, is also included. It is
expected to have a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of fraud litigation because it is a proxy for accruals manip-
ulation (Stice, 1991; Lys and Watts, 1994; Krishnan and Krishnan, 1997). We present more detailed def-
initions and the predicted signs of the eﬀects of the control variables in Appendix A.
4.1.2. Empirical results
In this section, we present the estimation of our models. We use probit regressions to estimate model 1 and
the two-stage bootstrap and Woodridge two-stage methods to estimate models 2 and 3.
The key independent variable in the probit model is the RM dummy. The key independent variable in the
two-stage bootstrap and two-stage Woodridge methods is the ﬁtted value of the RM dummy (RMﬁt) from the
ﬁrst stage. In each speciﬁcation, we report both the coeﬃcients and the marginal eﬀects that are computed at
the mean values of the other variables. We also report the p values of the F tests for each group of variables:
governance, auditor and ﬁnancial factors. The F test allows us to examine the overall eﬀect of each group of
factors on the likelihood of ﬁrms being targeted by short sellers. Year and industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included in
all three models. We cluster standard errors by ﬁrm to control for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and
within-ﬁrm serial correlation.
We report the descriptive statistics in Table 5. The mean value of RM indicates that CRMs account for
31.9% of the entire sample. The average value of SIZE is 5.38, equivalent to $217.02 million (=e5.38).
Table 6 reports the main results. In Panel A of Table 6, we present the ﬁrst stage of both the two-stage
bootstrap and two-stage Wooldridge procedures. In particular, we regress ﬁrms’ choice between reverse
merger and IPO on a series of exogenous factors to obtain the ﬁtted value. Exogenous factors include market
timing, high-tech industry and a range of ﬁnancial characteristics. First, market factors play a crucial role
when ﬁrms make their listing choice. Brau et al. (2003) ﬁnd that IPOs and reverse mergers occur in waves that
are negatively correlated, suggesting that market timing, also referred to as the “IPO period,” is a key factor
for ﬁrms to consider. Second, Ray (2008) documents that ﬁrms’ listing choices are also inﬂuenced by high tech
industries and high tech bubbles, as both are associated with higher IPO discount rates. Therefore, we include
an indicator dummy to control for the high tech industry. We also include ﬁnancial factors that correlate with
the listing choice, including ROE, ROA, leverage and total assets (Gleason et al., 2005; Jindra et al., 2012).
The results reported in Table 6 are consistent with previous ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher proﬁtabil-
ity, lower levels of institutional holdings and higher leverage ratios are more likely to go public through reverse
mergers, especially during non-tech bubble periods. We then use the ﬁtted value from the ﬁrst stage to explain
ﬁrms’ probability of being targeted by short sellers.
We report the structural regression results in Panel B of Table 6. In the probit model, the coeﬃcient on RM
is 1.6 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The marginal eﬀect is 28.4%, showing that, ceteris paribus, an RM ﬁrm is
28.4% more likely to be accused by short sellers. In the two-stage bootstrap and Wooldridge two stage models,
the coeﬃcients on RMﬁt are both 0.067, but neither is signiﬁcant. The results show that once the adverse
selection problem is taken into consideration at the initial stage, the plausible relationship between RM ﬁrms
and the probability of being accused by short sellers disappears. The reason we see a positive eﬀect of RM on
the probability of short seller accusation in the probit model is that ﬁrms that choose to go public via reverse
mergers are more likely to be associated with misconduct in the ﬁrst place.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean SD P5 Median P95
TARGET 1038 0.175 0.380 0.000 0.000 1.000
RM 1038 0.319 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000
INTCONTRL 1038 0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000
OUTSIDE% 1038 0.629 0.134 0.429 0.600 0.857
CEOCH 1038 0.703 0.457 0.000 1.000 1.000
CEOHD 1038 0.269 0.184 0.000 0.235 0.583
MNGHD 1038 0.352 0.212 0.002 0.334 0.711
BSIZE 1038 1.846 0.244 1.386 1.946 2.197
DA 1038 0.024 6.957 0.347 0.278 0.675
ADTRANK 1038 0.566 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000
AUDTFEE 1038 1.000 1.308 3.219 0.737 0.550
SIZE 1038 5.386 1.756 2.498 5.462 7.922
LEVERAGE 1038 0.356 0.211 0.071 0.335 0.764
ZSCORE 1038 1.926 4.909 0.000 0.000 10.356
GROWTH 1038 0.670 0.804 0.165 0.452 2.338
DIFFGR_IND 1038 0.000 0.772 0.836 0.179 1.539
DIFFGR_SELF 1038 0.048 0.913 1.540 0.000 1.509
ROE 1038 0.140 0.273 0.267 0.132 0.561
DIFFROE_IND 1038 0.086 0.211 0.318 0.141 0.413
DIFFROE_SELF 1038 0.019 0.288 0.455 0.003 0.432
INV 1038 0.079 0.106 0.000 0.035 0.285
DIFFIN_IND 1038 0.000 0.084 0.113 0.015 0.160
DIFFIN_SELF 1038 0.004 0.055 0.084 0.000 0.063
AR 1038 0.165 0.153 0.007 0.120 0.471
DIFFAR_IND 1038 0.000 0.135 0.154 0.027 0.268
DIFFAR_SELF 1038 0.002 0.087 0.118 0.001 0.154
HOTMKT 1038 0.371 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000
LODUE 1038 0.028 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.183
HIGHTEC 1038 0.256 0.437 0.000 0.000 1.000
INSTHD 1038 0.351 0.262 0.000 0.352 0.752
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two-stage model and the two-stage bootstrap model, which generally produce the same results.
A few audit factors also play an important role in determining short sellers’ targets. For example, audit fee
(AUDFEEt1) plays an important role in short sellers’ decision-making process. The negative coeﬃcient on
audit fee indicates that a higher audit fee can eﬀectively increase the quality of ﬁnancial reports and thus lower
the probability of accusation. However, the joint signiﬁcance test shows that auditor traits may not draw
much attention from short sellers. The p-value of the F-test is 0.294 in the Wooldridge two-stage model.
For governance factors, the coeﬃcient on internal control (proportion of outside directors) is signiﬁcantly
positive (negative), suggesting that the presence of material weakness (more outside directors) increases
(decreases) a ﬁrm’s probability of being accused. The results are consistent with the view that good corporate
governance can eﬀectively monitor managers and reduce the occurrence of ﬁrm misconduct. Firms with higher
manager shareholdings (MNGHDt1) are less likely to be accused by short sellers, suggesting that greater
alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests can eﬀectively curb misconduct. The F-tests suggest
that corporate governance factors are critical considerations for short sellers when choosing their targets.
Among the ﬁnancial factors, the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on sales growth suggests that ﬁrms with
high sales growth are more likely to be accused by short sellers. There are two possible explanations. First,
fast-growing ﬁrms have a high turnover of inventory or receivables and thus have a high risk of audit detec-
tion. Second, ﬁnancial fraud often involves inﬂation of earnings. Therefore, unusually high growth in sales
might reﬂect manager manipulation. When a ﬁrm’s growth rate is higher than the industry average, it is more
likely to be accused by short sellers, suggesting that an abnormal increase in sales is likely to be associated with
accounting manipulation. However, when the ﬁrm’s growth rate is higher than its average growth rate, the
probability is lowered. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high growth in accounts receivables are more likely to
Table 6
Multivariate analysis of short sellers’ strategies.
Panel A: Exogenous determinants of the reverse merger indicator
Independent variable: RM Coef. Z-stat.
ROEt 0.606
*** 3.27
LEVERAGEt 0.499
** 2.07
CCEOCHt 0.184 1.61
INSTHDt 2.505*** 11.27
LODUEt 0.297 0.52
HIGHTECt 0.600*** 4.91
CEOHDt 0.22 0.78
HOTMKTt 0.242
** 2.41
_CON 0.203 1.24
r2_p 0.18
Correctly-classiﬁed 75.29%
Panel B: Short sellers’ strategy analysis
Speciﬁcation Probit model Two-stage Two-stage bootstrap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables TARGET Marginal
eﬀect
TARGET Marginal
eﬀect
TARGET Marginal
eﬀect
Independent variables Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx Coef. dy/dx
RM or RMﬁt 1.600*** 28.40% 0.067 0.95% 0.067 0.95%
(2.865) (0.198) (0.395)
Governance factors
INTCONTRLt1 v1 1.081
*** 19.80% 1.229*** 27.20% 1.229*** 27.20%
(3.128) (3.757) (4.474)
OUTSIDE%t1 v2 7.038*** 81.60% 5.775*** 82.30% 5.775*** 82.30%
(4.469) (4.044) (5.956)
CEOCHt1 v3 0.196 2.14% 0.092 1.28% 0.092 1.28%
(0.613) (0.315) (0.474)
CEOHDt1 v4 1.350 15.70% 2.135 30.40% 2.135 30.40%
(0.728) (1.197) (1.643)
MNGHDt1 v5 2.524 29.30% 2.933* 41.80% 2.933** 41.80%
(1.575) (1.894) (2.431)
BDSIZEt1 v6 0.304 3.52% 0.610 8.69% 0.610
* 8.69%
(0.481) (0.925) (1.784)
F-test: eﬀect of governance factors
on short sellers’ decisions
v1 + v2 + v3 + v4 + v5 + v6
p = 0.0038** p = 0.0325** p = 0.0007***
Auditor factors q1
ADTRANKt1 1.091
*** 11.3% 0.302 4.12% 0.302 4.12%
(3.037) (0.911) (0.976)
DAt1 q2 0.294
*** 3.41% 0.299*** 4.27% 0.299 4.27%
(2.822) (3.071) (1.302)
AUDTFEEt1 q3 0.250** 2.90% 0.292*** 4.17% 0.292** 4.17%
(2.458) (3.323) (2.282)
F-test: eﬀect of auditor factors on short
sellers’ decisions
q1 + q2 + q3
p = 0.0039** p = 0.3861 p = 0.2941
Financial factors
SIZEt1 p1 0.207
** 2.40% 0.143* 2.04% 0.143 2.04%
(2.329) (1.838) (1.503)
ZSCt1 p2 0.022 0.25% 0.033 0.47% 0.033 0.47%
(0.933) (1.460) (1.640)
GROWTHt1 p3 9.039
** 104.8% 6.145* 87.6% 6.145*** 87.6%
(2.096) (1.823) (3.556)
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Table 6 (continued)
Speciﬁcation Probit model Two-stage Two-stage bootstrap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DIFFGR_INDt1 p4 9.455** 109.6% 6.531* 93.1% 6.531*** 93.1%
(2.192) (1.930) (3.823)
DIFFGR_SELFt1 p5 9.273
** 107.5% 6.358* 0.907% 6.358*** 0.907%
(2.147) (1.879) (3.703)
ROEt1 p6 0.527 6.11% 0.440 6.27% 0.440 6.27%
(0.760) (0.608) (0.710)
DIFFROE_INDt1 p7 0.566 6.56% 0.358 5.11% 0.358 5.11%
(0.842) (0.492) (0.506)
DIFFROE_SELFt1 p8 0.026 0.31% 0.073 1.04% 0.073 1.04%
(0.056) (0.153) (0.102)
INVt1 p9 0.492 5.71% 2.163 30.8% 2.163 30.8%
(0.124) (0.613) (0.655)
DIFFINV_INDt1 p10 2.239 0.260 0.843 12.0% 0.843 12.0%
(0.551) (0.228) (0.253)
DIFFINV_SELFt1 p11 3.857
*** 44.7% 3.290** 46.9% 3.290 46.9%
(2.609) (2.299) (0.968)
ARt1 p12 9.807
*** 113.7% 7.620** 108.7% 7.620*** 108.7%
(2.875) (2.480) (3.076)
DIFFAR_INDt1 p13 9.114
*** 105.6% 7.266** 103.6% 7.266*** 103.6%
(2.739) (2.365) (2.896)
DIFFAR_SELFt1 p14 1.070 12.4% 1.224* 1.74% 1.224 1.74%
(1.500) (1.779) (1.038)
LEVERAGEt1 p15 0.331 3.83% 0.661 9.43% 0.661 9.43%
(0.390) (0.816) (0.983)
F-test: eﬀect of ﬁnancial
factors on short sellers’ decisions
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 + p5 + p6 + p7 + p8 + p9 + p10 + p11 + p12 + p13 + p14 + p15
p = 0.0046** p = 0.0101** p = 0.0001***
Constant 1.073 0.889 1.006
(0.620) (0.577) (0.473)
Year ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry ﬁxed eﬀect YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo-R2 0.327 0.339 0.304
Obs. 834 834 823
This table reports the multivariate analysis of short sellers’ strategies. In Panel A, we present the ﬁrst stage of both the two-stage bootstrap
and Wooldridge two-stage procedures. The two-stage bootstrap procedure requires two steps to estimate Model 2. First, we predict the
ﬁtted value of reverse mergers. Then we use the ﬁtted value in the second stage regression and bootstrap the system 100 times. The ﬁrst step
in the Wooldridge two-stage approach is the same as in the two-stage bootstrap. In the second step, we use the predicted value as the
instrument to conduct the standard two-stage least squares procedure. In Panel B, we present the results using three speciﬁcations. We
estimate the following two models:
Model 1 (Probit):
ProbitðTargeti;tÞ ¼ b0 þ b1RMi þ cGovfactorsi;t1 þ nFinafactorsi;t1 þ /Auditfactorsi;t1 þ kIndustryi;t1 þ hYeari;t1 þ xi;t ð1Þ
Model 2 (Two-stage Bootstrap and Wooldridge Two-stage):
ProbitðRMi;tÞ ¼ d0 þ d1ROEi þ d2LEVERAGEi;t1 þ d3CEOCHi;t1 þ d4INSTHDi;t1 þ d5LODUEi;t1 þ d6HIGHTECi;t1
þ d7CEOHDi;t1 þ d8HOTMKTi;t1 þ mi;t; ð2Þ
ProbitðTargeti;tÞ¼ b0þb1RMfiti þ c0Govfactorsi;t1þn0Finafactorsi;t1þ/0Auditfactorsi;t1þk0Industryi;t1þh0Yeari;t1þxi;t: ð3Þ
t-Statistics are provided in parentheses. We cluster standard errors by ﬁrm, allowing for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-ﬁrm
serial correlation. Marginal eﬀects (dy/dx) are calculated at the mean values of the other variables and reported in Columns 2, 4, and 6. We
emphasize the marginal eﬀect in italics. Columns 1 and 2 report the result of the probit regression. Following the method used by Chang et al.
(2009), columns 3 and 4 report the regression using a two-stage bootstrap procedure. The likelihood of choosing reverse mergers is obtained
from the table. Columns 5 and 6 report the result of the Wooldridge two-stage procedure. We use the predicted probability of being a CRM
and use it as the instrument in the standard two-stage least squares procedure.
* Denote signiﬁcance levels of 10%.
** Denote signiﬁcance levels of 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%.
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managerial manipulation. The joint signiﬁcance of all of the ﬁnancial factors also suggests that relative ﬁnan-
cial factors are critical considerations in short sellers’ decision process, which supports Hypothesis 2.
4.2. Test of Hypothesis 3: post-accusation performance analysis
In this section, we further investigate the economic consequences of short sellers’ accusations in two steps.
First, we test the relationship between ﬁrms’ survival rate (time) and the incidence of accusations by short sell-
ers. Second, we summarize the price recovery process of accused ﬁrms.
4.2.1. Survival status analysis
The dynamics of the stock market (i.e., ﬁrms entering and exiting) lead to the reallocation of productive
resources from non-surviving to surviving ﬁrms (Baker and Kennedy, 2002). Whether a given company delists
or survives is greatly aﬀected by substantial fundamental change. Thus, ﬁrms’ survival status provides a means
to examine whether short sellers’ accusations are information-based. If the short sellers’ reports carry credible
information, then we would expect accused ﬁrms to have a higher delisting rate than other ﬁrms. Otherwise,
the delisting rate should be the same.
To test the eﬀect of short sellers’ accusations on ﬁrm survival rates, we use the two-stage bootstrap and
Woodridge two-stage methods to estimate model 5. The ﬁrst stage regression is the same as model 1, and
model 5 is7 As
Direct
requireP ðDelisti;tÞ ¼ F a0 þ a1Targeti þ a2RMfiti þ nControl Variablesi;t1½  ð4Þ
where:
Delisti,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm i was delisted in year t and 0 otherwise.
Targeti,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm i was targeted in year t by short sellers and 0 otherwise.
RMi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ﬁrm i was a reverse merger ﬁrm and 0 otherwise.
Controli,t1 is a series of lagged controls that other studies have included. Following Baker and Kennedy
(2002), we include ﬁrms’ proﬁtability measured by the natural logarithm of sales and ROA; the proportion of
collateral measured by the proportion of ﬁxed assets; and other ﬁnancial characteristics such as leverage and
size. We also include an ADR dummy, US market returns and a NASDAQ dummy. Chaplinsky and
Ramchand (2007) argue that ADRs are more likely to delist than their US counterparts due to the stricter
regulations introduced by the SOX act. The NASDAQ market has witnessed a higher incidence of foreign
ﬁrms delisting due to the simpliﬁed delisting process.7 We also control for market condition measured by
US stock market return and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial characteristics, such as ROA and ﬁrm size.
Panel A of Table 7 presents an overview of Chinese ﬁrms’ trading status as of December 31, 2012. Among
253 Chinese ﬁrms, only 134 (52.96%) ﬁrms remained active and 119 (47.04%) ﬁrms had delisted. Fifty (19.76%)
ﬁrms were acquired by other ﬁrms and 62 (24.51%) ﬁrms had delisted due to distress. Those that had delisted
due to distress can be further classiﬁed into nine categories. The leading cause (26 cases, 10.28%) is failure to
meet the exchange’s ﬁnancial guidelines for continued listing, followed by delinquency in ﬁling and non-pay-
ment of fees (8 cases). We report the empirical results of the delisting model 5 in columns 1–4 in Panel B of
Table 7. The results are generally consistent with our predictions. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms accused by short sellers
(Target) bear a higher risk of delisting in the future, even after controlling for other factors. When we use the
two-stage bootstrap speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of Target is signiﬁcant at the 1–5% level in columns 1–3. In
columns 4–6, we use the Wooldridge two-stage speciﬁcation and the result remains the same. Those results
support the view that ﬁrms that are targeted by short sellers are more likely to delist from the capital market.
With the control variables, we ﬁnd that companies are less likely to delist when they are proﬁtable and when
the market condition is optimistic, which is consistent with Baker and Kennedy (2002).Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007) document, “the NYSE requires that a ﬁrm gain the approval of its audit committee and Board of
ors before delisting, while NASDAQ simply requires a letter stating the reasons for delisting. In neither case is shareholder approval
d.”
Table 7
Post-accusation performance analysis.
Panel A: Overview of status of Chinese ﬁrms
Status Numbers Percentage (%) Cumulative percentage (%)
Active 134 52.96 52.96
Takeover delisting 50 19.76 72.73
Distress delisting 62 24.51 97.23
Insuﬃcient number of shareholders 3 1.19
Price fell below acceptable level 3 1.19
Insuﬃcient capital, surplus, or equity 5 1.98
Insuﬃcient ﬂoat or assets 3 1.19
Bankruptcy, declared insolvent 2 0.79
Delinquent in ﬁling, non-payment of fees 8 3.16
Failure to meet exception or equity requirements 1 0.40
Failure to meet exchange’s ﬁnancial guidelines for continued listing 26 10.28
Protection of investors and the public interest 11 4.35
Delisted for other reasons 7 2.77 100.00
Panel B: Market eﬀect
Dependent variables Delist
Two-stage bootstrap Wooldridge two-stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target 0.761** 1.342*** 0.753** 0.723*
(2.294) (2.592) (1.983) (1.734)
RM or RMﬁt 0.311 0.599 0.584 0.098
(1.252) (1.615) (0.537) (0.051)
ADR 3.202*** 0.240
(2.913) (0.222)
LNSALE 0.581** 0.089
(1.962) (0.361)
PPEAR 0.044 0.549
(0.045) (1.371)
SIZE 0.222 0.036
(0.442) (0.107)
ROA 3.248* 0.525
(1.828) (0.530)
LEVERAGE 1.621 0.276
(1.434) (0.420)
RETURN 44.365*** 0.293
(4.540) (0.199)
NAS 0.420 0.490
(0.826) (1.564)
Constant 6.103*** 13.677*** 7.106*** 1.603
(9.968) (4.002) (6.492) (0.684)
Year dummy YES YES YES YES
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES
Observations 586 408 623 405
r2_p 0.336 0.508 0.328 0.471
Panel A presents the overview of Chinese ﬁrms’ status quo in the stock market as of December 31, 2012. Panel B reports the empirical results of the
delisting models. In the two-stage bootstrap model, we ﬁrst predict the ﬁtted value of reverse merger (RM). Then we use the ﬁtted value in the second-
stage regression and bootstrap the system 100 times. In theWooldridge two-stage approach, the ﬁrst stage is the same as for the two-stage bootstrap. In
the second step, we use the predicted value as the instrument to conduct the standard two-stage least squares procedure. Themodels are listed as follows:
Model (two-stage bootstrap and two-stage Wooldridge):
ProbitðRMi;tÞ ¼ d0 þ d1ROEi þ d2LEVERAGEi;t1 þ d3CEOCHi;t1 þ d4INSTHDi;t1 þ d5LODUEi;t1 þ d6HIGHTECi;t1
þ d7CEOHDi;t1 þ d8HOTMKTi;t1 þ mi;t; ð2Þ
PðDelisti;tÞ ¼ F ½a0 þ a1Targeti þ a2RMfiti þ nControl Variablesi;t1 ð3Þ
t-Statistics are provided in parentheses. We cluster standard errors by ﬁrm, allowing for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-ﬁrm serial
correlations.
* Denote signiﬁcance levels of 10%.
** Denote signiﬁcance levels of 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%.
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In an eﬃcient market, stock prices incorporate a rich information set on a timely basis. Therefore, we fur-
ther test the credibility of short sellers’ accusations by investigating ﬁrms’ stock price patterns in the subse-
quent period. If short sellers’ accusations are groundless and misleading, investors will eventually realize
this and the stock prices of implicated ﬁrms should rebound to their fair values. Otherwise, the stock prices
are unlikely to recover after the accusations because the resulting price drops are informative about the poor
quality of those ﬁrms.
We measure ﬁrms’ price recovery rate as the percentage change in the stock price between the ﬁrst release
date of the short sellers’ report and the delisting date if the ﬁrm is inactive, or December 31, 2012, if the ﬁrm is
still active.P recovery ¼ P t  P accuseP accuse if firms are still trading; and
P recovery ¼ P delist  P accuseP accuse if firms were delisted;where Precovery denotes the percentage of price recovery, Pt represents the closing price on December 31, 2012
if the ﬁrm is still trading, Pdelist equals the delisting price if the ﬁrm is delisted and Pdelist is the stock price at the
ﬁrst release date of the short sellers’ report.
We summarize the price recovery pattern in Table 8. Consistent with the information analytics hypothesis,
none of the accused ﬁrms are able to recover their price to the original level (P recovery P 1). As many as 63.7%
of ﬁrms (P recovery 6 0) never push their stock price back up and only 4 ﬁrms (7.28%) recover more than 70% of
their price to the pre-accusation level. To better understand the distribution of the price recovery rate, we fur-
ther classify accused ﬁrms into a delisted group and an active group.5. Robustness tests
5.1. Robustness test for Hypothesis 1
In this section, we apply a propensity score matching approach as the robustness test, based on two con-
siderations. First, in cases where the probit model contains a binary endogenous explanatory variable, it is
diﬃcult to obtain a consistent estimation through the regular IV procedure because in the second stage esti-
mation we cannot pass the expected value through a nonlinear model. Even the modiﬁed procedure can only
mitigate, rather than fully address, this problem. However, as Wooldridge (2002) suggests, the propensity
score matching approach is attractive because there is no need to model the expected value of the independent
variable. Second, propensity score matching, as a nonparametric method, can exclude the possibility of viola-
tions of other classic assumptions, which can be a potential problem with the two-stage bootstrap and
Wooldridge two-stage procedures.
The results are reported in Table 9. The average treatment eﬀect (ATT) is 0.091 and signiﬁcant at the
1% level. This result shows that the ATT between the two groups is signiﬁcant if we use nearest neigh-
borhood matching, kernel density matching or local linear regression matching. The interpretation is that
in terms of the probability of choosing a reverse merger when going public, there are two similar groups:
the ﬁrst group goes public through reverse mergers but the other group does not. However, there is almost
no diﬀerence between the two groups in terms of the incidence of ﬁrms being accused of ﬁnancial fraud by
short sellers. Short sellers’ judgments of ﬁnancial fraud therefore do not rely on a ﬁrm’s identity (CRM or
CIPO).5.2. Robustness test for Hypothesis 3
It can be argued that the positive relationship between the delisting likelihood and short seller accusations is
driven by the feedback eﬀects of short sellers’ accusations, rather than ﬁrms’ fundamentals. If this were true,
we would expect ﬁrms’ survival times to be uncorrelated with short sellers’ accusations: ﬁrms will get delisted
Table 8
Price performance analysis.
Sample Full sample Delisted sample Still trading sample
P_recover Freq. Percent (%) Cum. (%) Freq. Percent (%) Cum. (%) Freq. Percent (%) Cum. (%)
1 P P recovery 2 3.64 3.64 0 0.00 0.00 2 6.90 6.90
90% P P recovery P 99% 6 10.92 14.56 3 11.54 11.54 3 10.34 17.24
80% P P recovery P 89% 5 9.10 23.66 2 7.69 19.23 3 10.34 27.59
70% P P recovery P 79% 6 10.92 34.58 5 19.23 38.46 1 3.45 31.03
60% P P recovery P 69% 3 5.46 40.04 1 3.85 42.31 2 6.90 37.93
50% P P recovery P 59% 6 10.92 50.96 3 11.54 53.85 3 10.34 48.28
40% P P recovery P 49% 3 5.46 56.42 1 3.85 57.69 2 6.90 55.17
30% P P recovery P 39% 2 3.64 60.06 0 0.00 57.69 2 6.90 62.07
20% P P recovery P 1% 2 3.64 63.70 0 0.00 57.69 2 6.90 68.97
0% P P recovery P 10% 14 25.48 89.18 10 38.46 96.15 4 13.79 82.76
20% P P recovery P 50% 2 3.64 92.82 0 0.00 96.15 2 6.90 89.66
70% P P recovery P 99% 4 7.28 100.10 1 3.85 100.00 3 10.34 100.00
Total 55 26 29
Panel A in Table 8 reports the price recovery rate of accused ﬁrms. We calculate the price recovery percentage of accused ﬁrms as follows:
P recovery ¼ P t  P accuseP accuse
if ﬁrms are still trading, and
P recovery ¼ P delist  P accuseP accuse
if ﬁrms are delisted,
where Precovery denotes the percentage of price recovery; Paccuse represents the stock price on the ﬁrst release date of the short seller’s
report; Pt represents the closing price on December 31, 2012 if the ﬁrm is still trading; Pdelist equals the delisting price if the ﬁrms is delisted;
and Paccuse is the original price at the ﬁrst release date of the short seller’s report.
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data analysis. We collect each ﬁrm’s survival time and apply a Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox pro-
portional hazard model allows us to use all available information, to deal with omitted between-ﬁrm variation
and to loosen the assumptions on the data’s distributional properties.
We present the results in columns 1–6 of Table 10. Because the Cox proportional hazard model transforms
the dependent variable into a hazard rate, the hazard ratio coeﬃcients are interpreted as a survival time scalingTable 9
Robustness test of Hypothesis 1: propensity score approach.
Outcome variable: TARGET
Matching method Treated Controls ATT T-statistics
Nearest neighborhood matching
Caliper = 0.1 0.091 0 0.091 1.00
Caliper = 0.05 0.091 0 0.091 1.00
Caliper = 0.01 0.111 0 0.111 1.00
Kernel density matching 0.335 0.004 .331 1.13
Local linear regression matching 0.335 0.003 .332 1.05
This table reports the two-stage average treatment eﬀect (ATT) using the propensity score matching method. The treatment variable is a
dummy variable (RM) that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm chooses reverse merger to go public and 0 otherwise. The outcome variable is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is accused by short sellers and 0 otherwise. In the ﬁrst stage, we calculate the propensity
score of every ﬁrm. In the second stage, a common support sample is chosen using three matching methods: nearest neighborhood
matching, kernel density matching and local linear regression matching. The ATT represents the average treatment eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s
identity (CRM or CIPO) on the probability of the ﬁrm being accused of ﬁnancial fraud by short sellers. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 10
Robustness test of Hypothesis 3: hazard model approach.
Hazard model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Survival time Marginal eﬀects Survival time Marginal eﬀects Survival time Marginal eﬀects
Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio
Target 0.271** 1.31 0.293* 1.34 0.298* 1.35
(2.498) (1.927) (1.918)
RM 0.121 0.89
(0.584)
ADR 0.571*** 1.70 0.513*** 1.66
(3.019) (3.201)
LNSALE 0.005 1.00 0.003 1.01
(0.044) (0.032)
PPEAT 0.132 0.87 0.097 0.89
(0.557) (0.419)
SIZE 0.163 0.84 0.182 0.83
(1.288) (1.492)
ROA 0.137 1.14 0.171 1.18
(0.306) (0.379)
LEVERAGE 0.869** 2.38 0.876** 2.40
(2.116) (2.169)
RETURN 0.299*** 0.74 0.291*** 0.74
(5.133) (4.961)
NAS 0.837*** 2.30 0.846*** 2.32
(3.643) (3.588)
Constant
Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 491 491 491
r2_p 0.001 0.017 0.017
This table presents the Cox proportional hazard model results. t-Statistics are provided in parentheses. We cluster standard errors by ﬁrm,
allowing for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-ﬁrm serial correlation. Marginal eﬀects (dy/dx) are calculated at the mean value
of the oﬀset.
* Denote signiﬁcance levels of 10%.
** Denote signiﬁcance levels of 5%.
*** Denote signiﬁcance levels of 1%.
128 H. Liu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 111–131factor: a hazard ratio greater than 1 accelerates failure (reduces survival time), whereas a hazard ratio less than
1 decelerates failure (increases survival time). Generally, the hazard rate for accused ﬁrms (Target) is 31–35%
higher than for non-accused ﬁrms, from the models with or without control variables. This result indicates
that short sellers are good at identifying fraudulent Chinese ﬁrms and forcing them out of the market.
Consistent with Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2007), we ﬁnd that the hazard rate is 113% higher for
NASDAQ ﬁrms (NAS) and 70% higher for ADR ﬁrms (ADR). The coeﬃcients on the other control variables
are consistent with the ﬁndings obtained from the probit model.6. Conclusion
The eﬀect that short sellers have on the ﬁnancial market has long been debated. Proponents argue that
short sellers are sophisticated investors who can identify over-priced stocks and improve price eﬃciency.
Dissenters, conversely, argue that short sellers use abusive trading strategies, dampen investor conﬁdence in
ﬁnancial markets and decrease market liquidity.
In this paper, we contribute to the debate by directly testing short sellers’ strategies in accusing Chinese
reverse merger ﬁrms of ﬁnancial fraud. Between 2010 and 2011, 62 CRMs were accused of fraud by short
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short sellers’ strategies. One hypothesis is that short sellers’ accusations against Chinese reverse merger
ﬁrms are based on information analytics. The other hypothesis is that short sellers indiscriminately accuse
Chinese reverse merger ﬁrms because of their association with other guilty Chinese reverse merger ﬁrms.
We ﬁnd little evidence that short sellers base their strategies on ﬁrms’ reverse merger identity. In the long
run, the accused ﬁrms are more likely to delist or fail to recover from the price drop following short sell-
ers’ accusations. The short sellers’ decision process involves comparing the target ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial indicators
(e.g., growth and receivables) with both the industry average and the ﬁrms’ histories to locate “bad
apples.” Fundamentals such as the quality of corporate governance are also crucial determinants in short
sellers’ decision process. Firms that have poor internal control, a small proportion of outside directors, a
low level of managerial shareholdings and low-quality audit reports are more likely to be targets of short
sellers. Our results suggest that CRMs’ high exposure to short sellers’ accusations stems from ﬁrms’
adverse selection: ﬁrms with a high litigation risk are more likely to choose a reverse merger to access
the US capital market.
Appendix A. Variable deﬁnitions
Deﬁnition and brief descriptions of variables
Variable Prediction DeﬁnitionTARGET A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm is involved in lawsuits
launched by short sellers targeting it and 0 otherwiseRM + A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm is CRM and 0 otherwise
OUTSIDE%  The proportion of outside directors on the board
MNGHD  The percentage of shares held by management
INTCONTRL + A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is material weakness
presents and 0 otherwise
AUDTORANK  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor is one of the BIG
FOUR and 0 otherwise
AUDTFEE  The logarithm of auditing fees
SIZE ? The logarithm of market value
GROWTH + Percentage change in sales from year t1 to year t
DIFFGR_IND ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s growth and industry average
DIFFGR_SELF ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s growth in year t and year t1
ROE  Net income/equity.
DIFFROE_IND ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s ROE and industry average
DIFFROE_SELF ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s ROE in year t and year t1
LEVERAGE ? Calculated from total debt divided by total assets
HIGHTEC A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a ﬁrm is in a high-tech industry
and 0 otherwise
HOTMKT A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if this year is a “hot” year and 0
otherwise
INSTHD ? The percentage of shares held by ﬁnancial institutions
CEOCH ? A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO also serves as the
board chairman and 0 otherwise
CEOHD ? The percentage of shares held by the CEO
LODUE ? Long term debt due in one year divided by liabilities
ZSC  Calculated from the Altman Z-Score model (Altman, 1968)
DA + Discretionary accruals estimated using the modiﬁed Jones model(continued on next page)
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ADR  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a foreign ﬁrm is an ADR and 0
otherwise
LNSALE  The logarithm of sales
PPEAT  The book value of property, plant and equipment divided by the book value
of assets
ROA  Calculated from net income divided by total assets
NAS  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the foreign ﬁrm is traded on
NASDAQ and 0 otherwise
AR + Accounts receivables divided by total assets
DIFFAR_IND ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s accounts receivables and industry average
DIFFAR_SELF ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s accounts receivables in year t and year t1
INV + Inventory divided by total assets
DIFFIN_IND ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s inventory and industry average
DIFFIN_SELF ? Diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s inventory in year t and year t1
INDUSTRY Dummy variables that are set to 1 if the ﬁrm is in a certain industry and 0
otherwise
YEAR Year dummyReferences
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